This is a guest post by Sam Vasisht. Sam is president of 21TechMedia, a Boston-based firm providing market entry and market growth
strategy consulting for tech companies. More of his contributions to
industry publications and other posts can be found on his blog at
www.techmediatalk.com, and you'll find him on twitter @21TechMedia.
With everything being said about the Netflix
price increase and its ripple effect in projected subscriber loss, as
well as the steep drop in stock price, we still may not know everything
that caused this unexpected turn of events for the video-rental company. I could list
here all the reasons that are being suggested including price
sensitivity, service bundles and competitive forces, but at the end of
the day the unexpected outcome could be more tied to consumer
behavior than any of the more obvious reasons. I expect that Netflix
modeled the price increase taking into account price elasticity
measurements to project some subscriber loss. Given that they then had to
change their Q3 guidance, something went terribly wrong.
Could it be that they did not take into account consumer inertia? Despite nearly perfecting how to make video recommendations
to consumers, does Netflix actually understand everything about its
users?
As consumers, we are, for the most part, creatures of habit. We don’t examine everything we do, nor why we do it, particularly when dealing with small ticket items. In the scheme of things, taking into account prices of other subscription services such as cable, Internet, and cellphones, Netflix is a small ticket item. Small ticket items are driven by impulse and inertia. Netflix probably benefited from both impulse and inertia for a long time.
More recently, Netflix was probably benefiting more from inertia, particularly in the DVD segment of its subscriber base. What Netflix did in announcing the price increase may have broken that inertia, more so than change people’s perception of the value of the service. It is still a small ticket item after all. When prompted, users will pay attention and make a choice. That is what Netflix did – prompt users – in a way that it probably did not anticipate.
Let’s hypothesize how this inertia and Netflix’s actions manifested itself:
For subscribers who were highly infrequent DVD users:
These are people who did not watch
sufficient DVD’s but kept the service out of inertia and frankly limited
other alternatives for the past many years. The price change woke them
from their slumber, and many decided to make a decision that could have
been postponed, in some cases indefinitely, had the inertia not been
broken. With the availability of Redbox and other kiosk
services, the tradeoff may have been sufficient for such users to drop
Netflix when they stopped to think about it.
Interestingly, these were also the most
profitable customers for Netflix. By waking their slumber, Netflix may
have done the greatest damage.
For subscribers who watched a lot of DVDs:
I expect a lot of these users are still
with Netflix, but it is possible that for some such users their high
appetite for DVDs is also being satisfied by Redbox. To pick up the
occasional Redbox impulse DVD while keeping a Netflix service would not
be out of the ordinary for such users. However, by creating a decision
point as a result of its price hike, Netflix would give these users
reason to pause on how to best allocate their dollars for their
voracious habit. For some the idea of an impulse rental at a nearby
Redbox outweighs the hassle of actually needing to pick up and return
the DVD. At a dollar a rental, that’s one DVD every other day for a $15
monthly spend. With Netflix, even with a 2 DVD option at approximately
the same price, the logistics don’t allow watching a new DVD every
other day. While that math alone may not have overtaken the previous
state of inertia, giving people a reason to pause with the price
increase, caused them to reevaluate their options. The
inertia was broken.
For the others in the middle:
Even among others, I expect Netflix broke
people out of their inertia. While many may have concluded that
Netflix is still good value for money, others may have felt compelled to
make a change. With the likes of Redbox popping up everywhere and
various attractive options for getting current TV programming online,
some customers likely chose alternatives over Netflix when prompted.
An interesting corollary, if you buy into this thesis, is that any
unbundling or price increase by Netflix could have triggered this behavior
and upset the apple cart as it did. So the actual dollar amount of the
price increase may have been less relevant than the directional change
of unbundling and price increase. This is where any quantitative
pricing models go out the window.
While it is important to monitor customer satisfaction (which actually woefully few companies do, but at least most know to try and keep customers satisfied), it may be just as important for companies to know why customers stay with them in the first place. Whether satisfied or not, if customers stay with you for reasons other than what you think, it may be a sign of other impending problems.
While it is important to monitor customer satisfaction (which actually woefully few companies do, but at least most know to try and keep customers satisfied), it may be just as important for companies to know why customers stay with them in the first place. Whether satisfied or not, if customers stay with you for reasons other than what you think, it may be a sign of other impending problems.
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